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Abstract: This study investigates disclosure behavior when a manager has incentives to influence the actions of
a product market competitor in a Cournot duopoly. Theoretical research suggests that under various conditions
the manager has incentives to withhold some signals and disclose others. Using an experimental economics
method, we find support for partial information disclosure. Our results suggest that when the manager receives
private information about industrywide cost, unfavorable (favorable) information is disclosed (withheld) and the
competitor adjusts production accordingly. In contrast, when the manager receives private information about firm-
specific cost, disclosure behavior is not affected by the favorableness of the information and the competitor’s
production decision is invariant to the disclosure choice.
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1. Introduction
This paper reports the results of two experiments designed to examine managers’
disclosure strategies and the resulting reaction of product market competitors.  Numerous
theoretical studies examine the manager's incentives to voluntarily disclose private information.  
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Early papers find that full disclosure is the only possible equilibrium outcome when the discloser is
known to possess information and disclosure is costless (Grossman, 1981; Milgrom, 1981).  Later
researchers relax the assumption of costless disclosure and allow for the possibility that the
discloser is uninformed (Jovanovic, 1982; Vives, 1984; Darrough and Stoughton, 1990; Feltham
and Xie, 1992).  In either case, a threshold level for disclosure obtains and partial disclosure may
result.  Increases in market value result from information disclosures and decreases in market
value from nondisclosures.  In choosing a disclosure strategy, the manager considers the reactions
of investors and rival firms.   For example, the manager may disclose favorable news in an attempt
2
to maximize the capital market's valuation of the firm, but such disclosure may prompt a
competitor to take actions that impose proprietary costs on the firm.  Thus, the manager balances
these forces when determining a disclosure strategy.
Theoretical studies recognize that disclosure and information-sharing incentives are
sensitive to the precise context, including the competitiveness of the market, the nature of private
information, and the market's uncertainty about whether the manager is informed.  Darrough
(1993) shows that incentives to disclose are affected by whether firms are engaged in Cournot or
Bertrand competition.  Sankar (1995) looks at a Cournot setting and demonstrates that managers'2
incentives differ depending on whether they receive information about industry-wide or firm-
specific conditions.   Dye (1985) and Jung and Kwon (1988) conclude that managers do not fully
3
disclose private information when market participants are unsure of whether managers are
informed.
The empirical literature on voluntary disclosure has produced mixed results.  Early
accounting studies (e.g., Patell, 1976; Penman, 1980) find a positive bias in management's
earnings forecasts and conclude that only firms with good news release forecasts.  Later studies
(e.g., Lev and Penman, 1990; Clarkson, Kao, and Richardson, 1994) find that forecasts are
unbiased on average.  Unbiasedness suggests that firms disclose good news and bad news, the
effects of which may offset each other.  The mixed findings may arise because it is difficult to
determine (control for) the proprietary costs resulting from the actions of rival firms.
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Other empirical studies use experimental methods to examine information disclosure
behavior in settings with investors.  King and Wallin (1990, 1991a, 1991b) conduct a series of
experiments in which a manager is endowed with an asset and, in some cases, receives private
information about its value.  The manager makes a disclosure choice and then investors bid on the
asset.  Experimental findings support full disclosure when the manager is known to possess
private information and antifraud rules are in place (see also Forsythe, Isaac, and Palfrey, 1989). 
The findings support partial disclosure when investors do not know whether the manager is
informed.
In an extension of earlier experimental work, King and Wallin (1995) investigate
disclosure equilibria in a setting with investors and an opponent (i.e., a competitor), though the
opponent’s behavior is specified exogenously.  Their results support a model of partial disclosure3
over one of full disclosure and are consistent with theoretical predictions (Wagenhofer, 1990). 
This paper has a similar focus.  We empirically examine disclosure behavior in a Cournot duopoly
in which the manager has incentives to influence the actions of a product market competitor. 
Unlike King and Wallin’s setting, we do not exogenously specify the product market competitor’s
behavior.  In our study participants take the role of either the manager or opponent and make
production decisions strategically.  
Sankar’s (1995) model of voluntary disclosure in an imperfectly competitive product
market provides the basis for empirical tests.  This model is distinguished from other models
predicting partial disclosure of information because it provides for cases in which firms selectively
disclose depending on the nature of the information.  The firm may or may not receive private
information, which relates to firm-specific and industry-wide uncertainty.  The model predicts that
favorable news is disclosed and unfavorable news is withheld if the news is more informative of a
firm-specific shock.  By comparison, favorable news is withheld and unfavorable news is disclosed
if the signal is more informative of an industry-wide shock.  Thus the disclosure strategy varies
across uncertainty and information conditions.  The model also shows that in all cases disclosure
increases with the probability that the manager receives private information.  In the limit, full
disclosure is predicted if the manager is known to possess private information with certainty.
Using an experimental economics approach, we conduct two experiments to investigate
the manager’s disclosure choice and the opponent’s reaction.  In experiment one (two), the
manager chooses to disclose or withhold private information about industry-wide (firm-specific)
cost and, in response, the opponent selects a production level.  The manager’s private information4
is favorable (i.e., costs are less than expected) in some periods and unfavorable in others.  Across
both experiments, we manipulate the probability that the manager is informed.
The use of an experimental method offers several advantages.  First, we are able to create
a Cournot duopoly in which participants have defined roles (i.e., manager and competitor). 
Second, we have control over the manager's information set and can directly observe disclosure
behavior.  Third, we are able to manipulate the parameters of the environment, which enables us
to observe the manager's disclosure strategy under different conditions.  The results reported in
this paper complement prior studies of naturally occurring markets and provide direction for
future theoretical work.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.  In Section 2, we provide an overview
of the Sankar (1995) model, which is our underlying framework.  In Section 3, we describe the
experimental setting and present the experimental predictions.  In Section 4, we report the
empirical results.  In the final section, we provide concluding remarks.
2. Framework
Two players, a manager and an opponent, participate in a Cournot quantity game with an
uncertain marginal cost of production.  The manager privately learns the marginal cost of
production with probability q and may choose to disclose this information to the opponent. 
Disclosures are assumed to be truthful in all cases.  The opponent receives no private information. 
The manager and the opponent then simultaneously choose their production levels, y  and y , M    O





the market, y = y  + y .  The market price is a decreasing function of aggregate output and is M    O
expressed as
where ( is a constant parameter for the industry.  The expected profit for each player is
where I = M or O, E(@) is the expectations operator, and c is the player's marginal cost of
production.   Each player's expected profit is increasing in own production and price.  Because
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price is decreasing in aggregate output, each player's expected profit is decreasing in expected
aggregate output.  The manager, however, can devise a disclosure strategy that results in an
increase in own production, while simultaneously decreasing aggregate output.  In this framework
there is an equilibrium threshold level of disclosure when production is nonnegative (for detail
refer to the Appendix).
3. Research method and experimental predictions
3.1. Overview and design
We conduct two experiments, each consisting of six sessions.  In experiment one,
participants face uncertainty about common, industry-wide costs.  In experiment two, they face
uncertainty about unique, firm-specific costs.  In both experiments, sessions are administered to
participants in groups of eight.  Four participants take the role of the manager and four of the
opponent.  Each period manager/opponent pairs are assigned, where player pairs represent6
competing producers.  Player pairs make production decisions across 16 periods and, each period,
all units produced are sold to the experimenter.  At the beginning of each period the manager
receives a signal that indicates the player's cost per unit with fixed probability (q).  Within each
experiment, the signal may be characterized as favorable or unfavorable conditioned on the
manager’s expectation of cost.  After receiving the signal, the manager determines the number of
units to produce and then sends a message to the opponent.  The message can convey the cost per
unit or, alternatively, it can convey nothing (nondisclosure).  Upon receipt of the message, the
opponent makes a production decision.  The experimenter then calculates the total production for
each player pair and determines the price per unit.  The selling price is communicated to player
pairs, who compute their profits for the period.
In experiment one, the distribution of the marginal cost of production and the outcome
(the cost per unit per period) are identical across the different player types (industry-wide cost). 
The manager is informed of the cost per unit with probability q.  The opponent, on the other hand,
is not aware of the cost unless it is disclosed by the manager.  In experiment two, the distribution
of the marginal cost of production and the outcome differ between player types (firm-specific
cost).  The manager's cost per unit is determined by sampling from a distribution that is known to
both players and the manager is informed of the cost with probability q.  By comparison, the
opponent's cost is constant per period and both the opponent and manager are aware of this cost.
Within each experiment, we manipulate q (the probability that the manager is informed)
across three levels: 100%, 90%, and 70%.  An examination of q=100% allows us to determine
whether full disclosure obtains when the manager is informed with certainty.  An examination of
q=90%,70% allows us to observe, under two different conditions, whether partial disclosure7
obtains when the manager is not informed with certainty.  Based on the experimental parameters
(discussed below), the behavioral predictions are not affected by whether q=90% or 70%.  By
manipulating q (between 90% and 70%), we are able to determine whether the results are
insensitive to the parameter value selected.  The experimental design is summarized in Table 1.
3.2. Procedures
At the beginning of each session participants receive a set of instructions that are read
aloud.   Participants are recruited from undergraduate and masters students and across the two
6
experiments 92 of 96 participants are business or economics majors.  Eight students took part in
each session.  In experiment one (two), students earned an average of $24.93 ($27.63) for
participating approximately 90 minutes.  The currency used in the experimental sessions is francs
and francs are converted to dollars at the end of each session at an exchange rate of $0.0625. 
Participants are provided with an endowment of 30 francs for participating. 
After completing the instructions, participants are randomly assigned a player role.  Those
assigned the role of the opponent complete the experiment in a separate room.  At the beginning
of each period, the experimenter in each room shuffles a deck of four cards numbered 1, 2, 3, and
4.  Each participant receives a card which is used to assign manager/opponent pairs for the period. 
Participants with the same numbered card are paired with each other but are unable to identify the
person with whom they are paired.
After player pairs are determined, the manager may be provided with a signal concerning
the marginal cost of production.  In experiment 1 the cost is common to the manager and the
opponent and in experiment 2 the costs differ.  Across both experiments, the marginal cost ofP ’ 20&(yM%yO)
8
(3)
production is 2, 4, or 6 francs per unit.  Participants are informed that the cost per period is drawn
from a distribution in which each cost is equally likely and periods are independent.   Within each
7
experiment, we manipulate the probability that the manager is informed (q): 100%, 90% or 70%. 
The probability remains constant throughout an experimental session and both players are aware
of the probability.  
After receiving a signal, the manager is allotted 45 seconds to determine the level of
production as well as the message to send to the opponent.  The message can indicate the cost per
unit, if the manager is informed, or "?", if the manager is uninformed or chooses to withhold the
information.  Using index cards, the experimenter communicates the manager's message to the
opponent.  The opponent is allotted 30 seconds to determine the level of production, after which
the experimenter computes the selling price for each player pair.  The selling price is determined
using the following relationship.
where the variables are as defined previously and each player's production is limited to 10 units
per period.  Player pairs are then informed of their selling price and instructed to compute profits
for the period.  After computing profits, player pairs are assigned for the next period.
At the conclusion of each experimental session, participants compute their earnings by
summing their profits over the 16 periods and multiplying by the conversion rate.  A post-
experiment questionnaire is administered while the experimenters pay participants in cash.
8
3.3. Predictions9
For each experimental session, we can determine a threshold level of disclosure.   The
9
threshold is the marginal cost of production at which the manager is indifferent between disclosing
and withholding marginal cost.  The manager’s disclosure choice, in turn, leads to a prediction
about the opponent’s production decision.  After learning of the manager’s disclosure choice, the
opponent may respond by varying production. 
Within each experiment, the manager’s disclosure strategy is affected by q (the probability
that the manager is informed).  In both experiments, full disclosure is predicted when q=100%. 
However, predicted disclosure strategies in the two experiments differ when q<100%.  As
compared to not disclosing, the opponent’s production level is expected to fall in experiment one
(two) when the marginal cost of production is 4 or 6 (2 or 4).
Partial disclosure is predicted when q=90%,70%.  In experiment one, the manager is
predicted to disclose marginal production costs of 4 or 6, which conveys an unfavorable signal. 
In experiment two, the manager is predicted to disclose marginal production costs of 2 or 4,
which conveys a favorable signal.  Across both experiments, the manager’s disclosure is expected
to lower the opponent’s production level.  The experimental predictions are summarized in Table
2.
4. Results
For each experiment, we conduct an analysis of variance (ANOVA) to determine whether
the manager’s disclosure strategy is affected by the signal received (marginal production cost 2, 4,
or 6), the probability that the manager is informed (100%, 90%, or 70%), and the interaction. 
The former (denoted SIGNAL) is a within-subject variable and the latter (denoted PROB) is a10
between-subject variable.  The dependent measure is the proportion of times that the manager
discloses a particular signal (e.g., for a given participant, the number of times that 2 is disclosed
divided by the number of times that it is received).   Hence, the dependent measure is computed
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by summarizing observations across periods within a subject.  This approach alleviates some
concerns that arise because disclosure choices may not be independent over time.
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For each experimental session, we compute the opponent’s production level for each
disclosure choice (2, 4, and 6).  We perform parametric, paired-t tests and nonparametric
Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranks tests to compare the average production level with that
observed when the manager withholds disclosure.  The comparisons allow us to determine
whether the opponent increases or decreases production in response to the manager’s disclosure
choice.
4.1. Experiment one
The ANOVA results, shown in Panel A of Table 3, indicate that SIGNAL and PROB are
significant at p<0.03 and the interaction is significant at p=0.053.  The cell means, reported in
Panel A of Table 4, provide insight into the results.  First we examine the cell means for SIGNAL. 
The data are consistent with partial information disclosure and suggest that unfavorable
information about industry-wide uncertainty (cost of 4 or 6) is more likely to be disclosed than
favorable information (cost of 2).  These findings provide support for the experimental
predictions.  We also note that disclosure is more likely as the information becomes less favorable. 
Next we examine the cell means for PROB and find that, when the manager is not informed with
certainty, partial information disclosure is observed as expected.  Post-hoc comparisons fail to11
indicate significant differences in disclosure behavior at p<0.05 when the manager receives a
signal of 4 or 6.  This finding is consistent with experimental predictions, which suggest that
disclosure behavior is similar when PROB=90%,70% (refer to Table 2).  When the manager is
known to be informed (PROB=100%), the predicted result is full disclosure.  Contrary to our
expectation, information is not fully disclosed and, in fact, disclosure is less likely than when the
manager is not informed with certainty. 
We also examine the opponent’s reaction to the manager’s disclosure choice.  Panel A of
Table 5 reports the average difference in the opponent’s production between no disclosure and
disclosure of 2, 4, and 6, respectively.  When the mean difference in production is negative
(positive), the opponent has lowered (raised) production in response to the manager’s disclosure
choice.  The results indicate a significant decrease in the opponent’s production when the manager
discloses the least favorable signal (cost of 6) and a significant increase when the manager
discloses the favorable signal (cost of 2).  These findings are similar using parametric and
nonparametric tests and are consistent with expectations.  Note, however, that we do not observe
a significant reaction by the opponent when the manager discloses a cost of 4.
4.2. Experiment two
Experiment two includes uncertainty about firm-specific cost.  The ANOVA results,
shown in Panel B of Table 3, indicate that none of the independent variables are significant at
conventional levels.  The cell means, shown in Panel B of Table 4, provide little support for the
experimental predictions.  Comparison of Panels A and B suggests that disclosure strategies in the12
two experiments differ.  However, in both experiments the manager chooses nondisclosure more
often than disclosure when informed with certainty.
Panel B of Table 5 reports the opponent’s reaction to the manager’s disclosure choice.  As
can be seen, none of the pairwise comparisons are significant at conventional levels.  The results
are consistent across parametric and nonparametric tests.  These findings suggest that the
opponent’s production decision is invariant to the manager’s disclosure choice.  Hence, the
manager may perceive that disclosure behavior does not matter, which may provide an
explanation for the ANOVA results discussed above (refer to Panel B of Table 3).
5. Conclusion
This study reports the results of two experiments designed to investigate disclosure
behavior when the manager has incentives to influence the actions of a product market competitor
in a Cournot duopoly.  Testable predictions derive from Sankar’s (1995) model of voluntary
disclosure in an imperfectly competitive product market.  In each experiment, the manager may
receive private information about cost uncertainty, where the information is either favorable or
unfavorable.  We manipulate the probability that the manager is informed across sessions.
In experiment one, private information involves industry-wide cost.  We find that when the
manager is not informed with certainty, partial information disclosure obtains and the results are
generally consistent with the experimental predictions.  The manager discloses unfavorable
information more frequently than favorable information and the opponent adjusts production
accordingly.  By comparison, when the manager is informed with certainty, the results are
contrary to expectations.  Observed disclosure occurs less frequently than when the manager is13
not informed with certainty.  In experiment two, private information involves firm-specific cost. 
We find that disclosure behavior is not affected by the favorableness of private information and
that the opponent’s production decision is invariant to the disclosure choice.  As in experiment
one, disclosure occurs less frequently when the manager is informed with certainty than when
uncertainty is present.
  Our findings highlight the importance of the nature of private information in understanding
disclosure behavior.  In general, archival studies using cross-sectional data do not identify the
nature of private information, which may account for the conflicting findings.  In the future,
researchers should attempt to control for the type of information when examining voluntary
information disclosure.  Our findings also suggest that, in a setting with a product market
competitor, additional research is necessary to understand disclosure behavior when the manager
is informed with certainty.  Surprisingly, we find that disclosure occurs relatively infrequently
under such conditions.  Future research may shed light on this issue.14
Appendix
The purpose of this appendix is to demonstrate that the parameters used in the
experimental setting are consistent with and generate the same predictions as Sankar’s (1995)
model of disclosure in an imperfectly competitive product market.
Prior to making a production choice, the manager (M) receives private information with
probability q.  The opponent (O) receives no private information.  The equilibrium production
choices for the two parties are given in Sankar’s Lemma 1 on page 835 and are repeated here.
Optimal Outputs
I. Industry-wide uncertainty
(1) M receives signal S and discloses it
y *(S*S) = 3b- [a - E(c*S)] M
1
y *(S) = 3b- [a - E(c*S)] O
1
(2) M receives signal S and withholds it
y *(S*N) =3b- [a - E(c*S) - (½)[E(c*S) - E(c*N)]] M
1
y *(S) =3b- [a - E(c*N)] O
1
II. Firm-Specific uncertainty
(1) M receives signal S and discloses it
y *(S*S) =3b- [a - 2E(c *S) +E(c *S)] M       M   O
1
y *(S) =3b- [a - 2E(c *S) + E(c *S)] O       O     M
1
(2) M receives signal S and withholds it
y *(S*N) =3b- [a - 2E(c *S) +E(c *S) +  (½)[E(c *S) - E(c *N)]] M       M   O      M     M
1
y *(S) =3b- [a - 2E(c *N) + E(c *N)] O       O     M
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In all cases the optimal expected profit is a function of the square of the optimal output, i.e., 
E(B**@) = b[y*(@)]
2
which is expression (5) from Sankar (1995).
The assumptions specific to our experimental setting are as follows:
(1) b =1,
(2) a = ( = 20,
(3) E(c *S) = S or perfect information, and M
(4) E(c *S) = C  where C  is a constant. O     O    O
With the fourth assumption the opponent’s private cost is not related to the manager’s signal. 
Given these assumptions, the expressions for optimal output can be rewritten as follows.
Optimal Outputs Given Our Assumptions
I. Industry-wide Uncertainty
(1) M receives signal S and discloses it
y *(S*S) = (1/3)[20 - S] M
y *(S) = (1/3)[20 - S] O
(2) M receives signal S and withholds it
y *(S*N) = (1/3)[20 - S - (½)[S - E(c*N)]] M
y *(S) = (1/3)[20 - E(c*N)] O
II. Firm-Specific Uncertainty
(1) M receives signal S and discloses it
y *(S*S) = (1/3)[20 - 2S +C ] M           O
y *(S) = (1/3)[20 - 2C  + S] O         O
(2) M receives signal S and withholds it
y *(S*N) = (1/3)[20 - 2S + C  +  (½)[S - E(c *N)]] M             O         M






Note that E(c*N) and E(c *N) are determined in equilibrium because the nondisclosure region M
(N) is determined in equilibrium.  The expressions for  E(c*N) and E(c *N) are M
and
where F(S*N) is the probability that an informed M does not disclose, E(c*S0N) is the
expectation of signals which M will not disclose, and C is the average cost (the expectation when
M is not informed).
Then using the cost distributions given in the paper the disclosure equilibrium can be
characterized as follows.
Characterization of a Disclosure Equilibrium
Distribution: f = {1/3, 1/3, 1/3}
I. Industry-wide uncertainty
(1) Conjecture: M withholds signal 2 and discloses 4 and 6 when q<1.
E(c*N) = (12 - 10q)/(3 - 2q)
(2) Conjecture: M discloses all signals when q=1.
II. Firm-Specific uncertainty
(1) Conjecture: M withholds signal 6 and discloses 2 and 4 when q<1.
E(c*N) = (12 - 6q)/(3 - 2q)17
(2) Conjecture: M discloses all signals when q=1.
These expressions are used to calculate E(B**@) when M discloses (D) and withholds (N)
information.  The point where E(B**D) and E(B**N)  intersect is the threshold level of disclosure
and is denoted s’.
Disclosure Thresholds
I. Industry-wide uncertainty
q = 0.70, s’ = 3.125
q = 0.90, s’ = 2.500
q = 1.00, s’ = 2.000
II. Firm-Specific uncertainty
q = 0.70, s’ = 4.875
q = 0.90, s’ = 5.500
q = 1.00, s’ = 6.00018
1. A related literature examines information sharing.  These papers often deal with the sharing of
information among rival firms in oligopolistic product markets (e.g., Clarke, 1983; Gal-Or, 1985;
Kirby, 1988).  The type of information is an important determinant of a firm’s strategic behavior
in the presence of asymmetric information.  In Cournot settings, firms agree to share firm-specific
cost information, but not industry-wide demand information.  Information sharing has also been
examined experimentally by Isaac and Reynolds (1986).  Our investigation is distinct from the
information sharing approach which assumes that firms commit ex ante to share information.  The
disclosure decision cannot be altered after the private news is observed.  As Okuno-Fujiwara,
Postelwaite, and Suzumura (1990, p. 26) argue, “the ex ante calculation is usually at variance
with the calculation once the private information is known, at least for some realizations of the
random variables.”
2. The manager is presumed to act in the best interest of the firm.
3. The industrial organization literature recognizes that the nature of the information impacts
whether competitive firms agree to share information.  Vives (1990) points out that the United
States courts’ views of information sharing by rival firms is affected by the nature of the
information.  The sharing of firm-specific information has been viewed with suspicion, whereas
the sharing of aggregate information has raised few objections.  
4. Other possible explanations for the inconsistent findings include different sample periods and
measures of the market’s earnings expectation.
5. Without loss of generality, fixed cost is assumed to be zero.
6. A copy of the instructions is available from the authors upon request.
7. We randomly determined the marginal cost of production per period before conducting the 12
experimental sessions.  The pre-selected sequence was used across all sessions in order to
maximize comparability.  Cason and Friedman (1996) discuss the benefits of using a pre-selected
sequence.
8. The responses on the post-experiment questionnaire indicate that participants found the
experiment interesting and the monetary incentives motivating.  Participants responded on a seven-
point scale as to how interesting they found the experiment, where 1 = not very interesting and
7 = very interesting.  In experiment one (two), the mean response was 5.38 (5.79).  Participants
also responded on a seven-point scale as to how they would characterize their earnings, where 1
= nominal amount and 7 = considerate amount.  In experiment one (two), the mean response was
5.16 (4.97).
9. The experimental predictions (shown in Table 2) are from Sankar’s (1995) Lemma (1)
assuming that b = 1, a = ( = 20, perfect information, and the opponent’s private cost is not
Endnotes19
related to the manager’s signal.  See Appendix for detail.
10. Press (1972, pp. 264-265) warns that when using proportions as the dependent measure,
variances are a function of treatment means, which implies heteroskedasticity.  He recommends
applying an arcsine, square-root transformation to circumvent the problem.  Although not
reported, the ANOVAs are repeated using the transformed dependent measure and inferences are
unaffected.
11. The down side of our approach is that it reduces the number of observations that are available
for analysis.20
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Cost q Experimental Disclosure Signals Opponent’s




100% 1-2 2.000 2,4, and 6 same or lower
90% 3-4 2.500 4 and 6 lower
70% 5-6 3.125 4 and 6 lower
Experiment 2
Cost q Experimental DisclosureT Signals Opponent’s




100% 7-8 6.000 2,4, and 6 lower or same
90% 9-10 5.500 2 and 4 lower
70% 11-12 4.875 2 and 4 lower
Notes: The opponent’s production reaction assumes that the manager’s disclosure choices are
consistent with the experimental predictions.24
Table 3
ANOVA results: The effect of PROB and SIGNAL on Disclosure
Panel A: Experiment one
Effect degrees of sum of squares F-statistic p-value
freedom
Between-Subject Effect
PROB 2 1.80 4.22 0.029
Error 21 4.46
Within-Subject Effects
SIGNAL 2 2.80 24.94 0.000
PROB x SIGNAL 4 0.57 2.55 0.053
Error 42 2.35
Panel B: Experiment two
Effect degrees of sum of squares F-statistic p-value
freedom
Between-Subject Effect
PROB 2 0.41 1.17 0.330
Error 21 3.72
Within-Subject Effects
SIGNAL 2 0.12 0.47 0.630
PROB x SIGNAL 4 0.48 0.92 0.464
Error 42 5.52
Notes: PROB is the probability that the manager is informed (100%, 90%, or 70%) and SIGNAL
is the signal received by the manager (2, 4, or 6).  The dependent variable is the proportion of
times that the marginal cost of production is disclosed conditioned on the manager receiving a
particular signal.25
Table 4
The proportion of times that industry-wide information is disclosed
Panel A: Experiment one
PROB Total
Signal Received by the Manager
SIGNAL=2 SIGNAL=4 SIGNAL=6
100% 0.28 0.35 0.53 0.38
90% 0.57 0.75 1.00 0.77
70% 0.16 0.60 0.92 0.56
Total 0.33 0.57 0.81 0.57
Panel B: Experiment two
PROB Total
Signal Received by the Manager
SIGNAL=2 SIGNAL=4 SIGNAL=6
100% 0.50 0.29 0.35 0.38
90% 0.34 0.58 0.44 0.45
70% 0.56 0.68 0.46 0.57
Total 0.47 0.52 0.42 0.4726
Table 5
A comparison of the opponent’s production decision when information is disclosed versus
withheld
Panel A: Experiment one
Comparison Mean Difference t-statistic z-statistic
in Production (p-value) (p-value)
Disclose0 vs. Disclose2 0.66 2.09 -2.01
(n=18) (0.026) (0.022)
Disclose0 vs. Disclose 4 0.29 1.36 -1.17
(n=23) (0.624) (0.121)
Disclose0 vs. Disclose6 -0.51 -1.98 -2.07
(n=23) (0.031) (0.019)
Panel B: Experiment two
Comparison Mean Difference t-statistic z-statistic
in Production (p-value) (p-value)
Disclose0 vs. Disclose2 -0.29 -0.89 -0.64
(n=22) (0.193) (0.260)
Disclose0 vs. Disclose4 -0.06 -0.27 -0.35
(n=23) (0.396) (0.364)
Disclose0 vs. Disclose6 0.19 0.46 -0.83
(n=22) (0.376) (0.204)
Notes: Disclose0 denotes that information about the marginal cost of production is withheld. 
Disclose2, Disclose4, and Disclose6 denote that the manager discloses a marginal cost of 2, 4, and
6, respectively.  Paired t-tests and Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranks tests are performed to
compare the opponent’s production decision when information is disclosed versus withheld.  The
p-values represent one-tailed values.  The sample sizes vary across comparisons because certain
costs were never disclosed to some opponents 